ΑΛΛΗΛΕΓΓΥΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ: ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΣΤΟ ΠΕΔΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΦΥΓΙΚΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΚΛΗΣΕΙΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ
48 EU Solidarity in managing migration flows through ECHO in Greece 3/2016-3/2019 ticle 80 TFEU according to which: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.” However, measuring, or quantifying “fairness”, or “solidarity” has always been an important obstacle in applying solidarity among member states of the EU in the field of asylum and migration, as none of these two terms include specific goals - or the standards to meet those goals - 11 not even during “refugee emergencies” 12 . This is a paradox, since asylum is always seen as a field requiring solidarity in practice (or de facto) and requesting “burden sharing”, because the reception and protection of persons on the move was widely seen as a burden on receiving countries. A phenomenon that can occur unexpectedly and on a large-scale, whereas geography is pivotal in such an emergency. Such a policy of solidarity would ask for either a) physical dispersal or resettlement of asylum seekers /refugees /migrants, or b) financial aid to receiving countries to “ease” the burden, or both. Establishing certain criteria remains still under discussion [whether justice - based (receiving country GPD, population, size of territory) or outcome - based (consequences of hosting persons in need of international protection, security, societal relations]. Still relevant efforts on building a European Agenda on Asylum and Migration have continued throughout the current management of the migration flows crisis. Faced with the emergency of the humanitarian consequences in Greece, but also other border member states, the European Commission announced in September of Responsibility, Including its Financial Implications, Between Member States in the Field of Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration’ April 2011, PE 453.167 att p. 6 et seq, accessed at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/ join/2011/453167/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2011)453167_EN.pdf p.p. 8-12. 11. For relevant studies on the subject of “fairness” and “burden sharing” in asylum and immigration see Betts, A, Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugee Protec- tion: The Role of the Joint-Product Model in Burden-Sharing Theory. Journal of Refugee Studies, 16 (3) (2003), 274-296; Boswell, C. (2001). Spreading the “Costs” of Asylum in Europe: Lessons from the UK and German Experience. Journal of Refugee Studies, 16 (3) (2003), 316-335; Noll, G., Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in the Asylum Field. Journal of Refugee Studies, 16 (3) (2003); 236-252; Thielemann, E. (2003). Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European Union. Journal of Refugee Studies, 16 (Special Issue), 253 – 273; Thielemann, E . Be- tween Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European Union. 16 (3) Journal of Refugee Studies, 2003, 253 – 273; van Selm-Thorburn, J. Refugee Protection in Europe: Lessons of the Yugoslav Crisis Amsterdam: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998. 12. Suhrke, A, Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National Action. 11 /4 Journal of Refugee Studies , 1998, 399-400.
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