ΑΛΛΗΛΕΓΓΥΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ: ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΣΤΟ ΠΕΔΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΦΥΓΙΚΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΚΛΗΣΕΙΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ

60 EU Solidarity in managing migration flows through ECHO in Greece 3/2016-3/2019 4.1. Political and institutional constraints of substituting political action with humanitarian aid EU’s Agenda on Asylum and Immigration was designed by the European Commis- sion and the Council in an effort to reach a compromise, politically, on how to address a huge influx of migrants in the EU in 2015. Notwithstanding other chal- lenges of the relevant efforts of the EU, one less examined aspect is linked to the ESI mechanism as a way to implement a largely political agenda in Brussels. There have been so far no relevant analyses as to how could a political agenda to address refugee and migration flows (such as hot spots, relocations and resettlements, closed borders, need to revise “Dublin” and to enhanced security in an ill func- tioning Schengen area) be implemented through the means of a humanitarian aid office, which is normally triggered for emergencies outside the EU, and should be neutral to political expediencies, by applying humanitarian principles enshrined in international humanitarian law 49 . Was it enough to include in the ESI Regulation a reference to the requirement “to respect principles stemming from international humanitarian law” or was there a need in the EU to use political means to address the crisis in the EU Member State cooperation and understanding of the needs for a better division of responsibilities within the EU so as to avoid confusions? Humanitarian principles are an important dimension of EU humanitarian aid pol- icy. The nature of any “humanitarian” work respecting them, means that needs should be the basis of any decision taken and the aim should always be to “al- leviate human suffering”. However, since the beginning of the ESI mechanism, certain needs of beneficiaries in Greece were – deliberately (?) - not addressed at all (for instance those involved in return or repatriation schemes in the five hot spots). Protection gaps also existed (such as not addressing all vulnerable groups, or the mental health inside or outside the camps) 50 . The exclusion was “hideen” as people on the five islands that were chosen as “hot spots” following the EU-Turkey Statement were not included as beneficiaries, if they were included in “return or repatriation procedures”. The political agreement with Turkey itself was not tak- en into account when designing the mechanism in Brussels, even if it resulted in an imposition of a geographic limitation of all those entering Greece through these to be able to compare efficiency, costs and sustainability, they had to compare aid to Greece with humanitarian assistance provided to countries outside the EU. So, the results were not easy to compare (e.g. rents in Greece are much higher, therefore the shelter and accommodation comparisons produced distorted statistics). Another issue encountered was that most framework partners had left the camps when evaluation took place, so they did not provide relevant feedback on the projects and the value of the mechanism. 49. See for both documents footnote 24. 50. Danish Red Cross Mental Health Report, Lesvos, 2018.