ΑΛΛΗΛΕΓΓΥΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ: ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΣΤΟ ΠΕΔΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΦΥΓΙΚΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΚΛΗΣΕΙΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ

Maria Daniella Marouda 61 islands and to a large number of stranded migrants. In addition, when in the land borders migration flows increased by 30% in the first months of 2018, areas such as the Reception Center of Fylakio (Evros), remained - for political reasons - outside the reach and mandate of ESI. This was largely due to the political choices made in Brussels, which adopted the priorities on the provision of humanitarian aid in Greece. If aid is not based on needs but is rather a substitute for political agree- ment on managing refugee and migration flows then it defies the very purpose it is provided for 51 . This challenge of using humanitarian aid as a substitute to pollical action is an inherent obstacle in the any humanitarian action designed together or in parallel with other political interventions to address and manage a crisis. Studies on hu- manitarian assistance used as a substitute of robust political solutions are critical to their efficiency of addressing the humanitarian consequences of the crises 52 . Do we see analogies in the way EU decided to support Greece in 2016 with a vast amount of funds of a retroactive effect and minimum accountability of how these funds would be used? Could we say that the European Commission led by Juncker decided to help Greece that even if facing a devastating financial crisis showed an unprecedent solidarity towards refugees and migrants that were reaching its bor- ders in 2015? The provision of humanitarian aid has always been a highly political activity. Hu- manitarian action is designed to mitigate the effects of governmental strategies towards victims of conflicts or disasters and always have an impact on the politi- cal economy of a target country. Thus, the provision of humanitarian assistance has always been influenced by political considerations on the part of donors and certain NGOs mostly working side by side with their governments. This is why us- ing political criteria to determine the allocation of humanitarian assistance is constrained by applying the conventional principles of humanitarian action: neu- trality, impartiality and independence 53 . In the EU, these principles are reflected in the Consensus on humanitarian aid (December 2007) as well as in the working methods of ECHO (specific clause in all grants). Especially since ECHO as a Direc- torate was separated from the developmental policies of the EU (which is always subject to political conditionality), as well as by channeling resources through in- ternational organizations, or humanitarian actors such as the International Com- mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and more recently through international NGOs, se- cured political distance between donor and recipient countries in both practice and in theory. 51. See Marouda, 2012 on the politics of humanitarian aid footnote27. 52. Supra and Versluys 2009, footnote34. 53. On the content of the principles, see Marouda 2012 footnote 27.