ΑΛΛΗΛΕΓΓΥΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ: ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΣΤΟ ΠΕΔΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΦΥΓΙΚΗΣ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΚΛΗΣΕΙΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΕ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ

66 EU Solidarity in managing migration flows through ECHO in Greece 3/2016-3/2019 acknowledged by the internal evaluation of the European Commission. This has delayed progress and is a lost opportunity of such a mechanism. For example, it was in the first 8 months from the activation of the mechanism, when synergies remained problematic, that 55% of the funding was allocated. Funding that was not necessarily adequately monitored, with large number of projects that dupli- cated efforts, a chaotic atmosphere largely prevailed (Lack of consolidated data and discrepancies to numbers of beneficiaries - data given by UNHCR and ESI were substantially different - confusion in the monitoring of ESI funding or the projects of AMIF, no links between emergency relief and integration et al) 59 . So, even if channeling funds through ECHO’s partners guaranteed swift action, it implied that national and local authorities or NGOs with a solid knowledge of the Greek context were initially excluded. The situation did improve in the second and third year of the mechanism, and such a mechanism proved to be a learning process for all -coordination clarification of roles and responsibilities within the EU different Di- rectorates, funding, mechanisms and with national authorities, local authorities, framework partners and civil society in Greece. Finally, three national NGOs did become framework partners of ECHO themselves. 4.3. Was ESI an effective solidarity exercise for the EU? Reaching a high number of persons in need was according to the internal eval- uation of the European Commission a “main achievement” of ESI and “improv- ing their situation” in comparison to March 2016 (in particular shelters, access to health services, access to cash). Attributing an additional funding mechanism of a swift dispatch of almost 700 million euros with no strings attached, with such a low objective of a mere “improvement” in their situation, in order to evaluate its effectiveness is somewhat disappointing though. Anything would have improved the dire situation of these persons in 2016. Other factors should have been used. For example the number of beneficiaries and their satisfaction (only 50% of those interviewed acknowledged a “low level of satisfaction”, higher in protection and education and much lower in shelter and cash services, or food, which was the most expensive part with a funding percentage of 70%). Other factors that were measured were that national and local authorities as well as the civil society in Greece increased their preparedness and resilience as a result of ESI. The inter- nal evaluation of the mechanism concluded that exit strategies of the different projects were overall successful, even if they acknowledged exit strategies were only taken into account in the third year, following the extension of the program. For example, although initial hand over to the authorities in the camps (from 59. See De Radigues L and Gammarelli L., Applying the European humanitarian expertise to reponnd to needs inside Europe, Humanitarian Exchange , 67 2016, p 8-10 and Latimir K., National volunteers in international crisis: the view from inside,67 Humanitarian Exchange 2016 29-31 and internal evaluation, see footnote 40.