MARITIME ALLIANCES AND EU COMPETITION LAW

109 DOMINANT POSITION AND ABUSE INDICATORS IN LINER SHIPPING Reacting to this noteworthy fall of revenue, shipowners take radically different managerial stance from the trends followed by inland enterprises. For example, during crisis (see the collapse of rates, as shown in figure 9 above), liner companies preferred to dock their vessels empty of cargo (ballast) and leave the idle, rather than demolishing them. Had the maritime industry followed the views of inde- pendent industry experts, the world would have suffered from extreme shocks due to the undersupply of vessels, during the last few years, as there was a very long lead time between investment and capacity entering the market. 131 This is another paradox in comparison to inland companies: price coordination occurs indirectly. An independent in the shadow of a conference or a consortium also benefits from price planning. Accordingly, the “outsiders” lower their prices slightly (say, by about 10 to 15 per cent), 132 a calculated risk and this differential is proportionally maintained even when conferences decide to modify their own rates. This proves that independents systematically follow conference policies 133 and adjust their pricing policy accordingly. Dual synchronisation is henceforth the key element that governs shipping markets: between trade flows and freight, between consortia and independents. So far, there is no international coordination that would suggest the opposite. In any event, it is up to the business discretion of independents whether to become a consortium member or continue to operate independently. 13. Competition by Non-Vessel Operators (NVOs) The maritime market serves the transnational transport of goods on a large scale. The task of transfer is achieved by non-vessel operators (NVOs) such as shippers and freightforwarders who operate vehicles, locomotives and airplanes. 131. ELAA Response to Issues Paper (2006), op. cit. 108, 6. 132. Fearnley Consultants and Global Insight and Holman Fenwick & Willan (Law Firm), Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services [EU Report COMP/2006/D2/002, Oslo, 22 Feb 2007] 152-153. 133.  TACA decision (1998) op. cit. 35, paras 534-537; Revised TACA op. cit. n. 51 para 1074; Hercules M. Haralambides and Michael Fusillo and U. Hautau and William Sjostrom and Albert W. Veenstra, “The Erasmus Report: Global Logistics and the Future of Liner Ship- ping Conferences” Report prepared for the European Commission’s Competition Directorate General “for assistance in processing public submissions to be received in response to the “con- sultation paper” on the review of Council regulation 4056/86 (2003) 34-36. <academia.edu/attachments/30294943/download_file?st=MTU4Mjg5NjY3OCwxMzk uMTM4LjIxNC4yNDEsMTgwMjE0Mjg%3D&s=swp-toolbar&ct=MTU4Mjg5NjY4M- SwxNTgyODk2Njg3LDE4MDIxNDI4> [accessed 28 Jan. 2019], whereby the declarations of French shipowners (Armateur de France) are presented (during the review process of 4056/86). Also see: Blanco op. cit. n. 14 p. 467. See Bonassies op. cit. n. 61 p. 199 et seq.