MARITIME ALLIANCES AND EU COMPETITION LAW

102 MARITIME ALLIANCES AND EU COMPETITION LAW importance of uniform rules in the maritime industry, given its global character. We observe that the authors above do not object to the mindset of free competi- tion that the EU wishes to promote in liner shipping but that their concern is concentrated on three issues: – A global industry must not be legislatively fragmented, in contrast to the pioneering jurisdictional intervention made by the EU; – The true properties of the sector have to been taken in to account, dismiss- ing thus the strict interpretation of Article 101 TFEU as simplistic; – The potential risk that a unilateral change could create to the stability of the transport system must be considered in legislation/judicial findings etc. We agree with the concerns of the aforementioned authors and their views are per- haps confirmed by the current slump in the freight market and the world recession that has plunged several container companies into severe financial difficulties. 113 Both authors, supported by economists, suggest that mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures in shipping “do not, in principle, create monopoly or market power or restrict competition ”. 114 In the same context, the Federal Maritime Commis- sion (FMC) in its liner transport Report confirmed the assumptions of the critics, as it shows that the freight rates have fallen, whereas concentration in the market has increased. 115 The Report examines the post repeal market effects. From the findings it appears to have been a small increase in market concentration – a result the threat of impending fragmentation of international sea commerce by inconsistent and idiosyncratic national legislation that led even the imperial power of Great Britain to rec- ognise its national interests in a coherent international bargain. The appreciation of this background should then inform the interpretation of the Hague Rules as a balanced at- tempt as far as they went to compromise these differences, with due recognition of the con- tours and context of particular compromises.” 113. The opinion of Bredima (2010) has special significance given her professional and aca- demic status. She has been the senior policy advisor on European affairs at the Cyprus Un- ion of Shipowners, member of the Board of the European Community Shipowners Associ- ations (ECSA) and director of International / European Affairs at the Union of Greek Ship- owners (UGS). As it is known, the UGS, in their overwhelming majority, are dry-liquid bulk tramp carriers, which, logically, would have every interest for liner conferences to be abolished. Nevertheless, a criticism of the EU regulatory effort arrives from an unexpected source; we thus receive a legal risk assessment that disagrees with the official EU Commis- sion competitiveness prediction. 114. Photis Panayides and Stephen Gong, “Consolidation, mergers and acquisitions, in the shipping industry” in Costas Grammenos (ed.), Handbook of the Maritime Economics and Business (London: Lloyd’s of London Press 2002) 603. 115. Bureau of Trade Analysis, Study of the 2008 Repeal of the Liner Conference Exemption from European Union Competition Law [Federal Maritime Commission January 2012 - uploaded in February 2013] <www.fmc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FMC_EU_ Study_508compliant.pdf> [accessed 20 Oct 2010] para 17.