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Key priorities for the EU and the case of Greece

A. DAGOUMAS

99

of a single body charged with purchasing gas supplies

2

. In addition, a recent report

examined how the EU could diversify its energy supply to improve its energy securi-

ty

3

. Furthermore, the European Commission conducted an in-depth study on European

Energy Security

4

that accompanied its Communication on European Energy Security

Strategy

5

.

In response to the aforementioned concerns, the European Commission released its

Energy Security Strategy, in May 2014. The Strategy aimed to ensure a stable and abun-

dant supply of energy for European citizens and the economy. According to EU find-

ings, the Union imports more than half of all the energy it consumes. One key fact

that stands out in the studies undertaken by the EU is that the Union imports 53% of

the energy it consumes. Specifically, its import dependency for crude oil is particularly

high - almost 90%, and for natural gas 66%. To a lesser extent, EU imports of solid

fuels stand at 42% and nuclear fuel at 40%. Energy security of supply concerns every

Member State, although some are more vulnerable than others, such as Baltic States

and the South Eastern European countries that are less integrated into the current EU

energy system. The most pressing energy security of supply issue, however, remains the

strong dependence on a single external supplier. Supply disruptions need not only be a

product of political disputes, but they can also be caused by commercial differences or

possible infrastructure failure, as well. The EU’s energy dependency proved particularly

problematic during the 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis because some member states relied

either exclusively or predominantly on Russian gas leaving them to face acute short-

ages in gas supplies in the middle of the winter.

Figure 1 represents the natural gas dependency of each EU member state from Russia.

To assess the effects of a possible gas disruption on the EU, the Commission published

a Communication on the short-term resilience of the European gas system and the

level of preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the

fall and winter of 2014/2015

6

. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a 6-month gas disrup-

tion from Russia in each of the EU member states. These figures clearly highlight the

2. Patrick Donahue, ‘Poland’s Tusk Proposes Energy Union to Break Russian Hold on Gas’,

Bloomberg

Business,

April 22, 2014, viewed on July 3, 2015, <

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-

cles/2014-04-22/poland-s-tusk-proposes-energy-union-to-break-russian-hold-on-gas >.

3. Leal-Arcas, Rafael and Alemany Rios, Juan, How Can the EU Diversify its Energy Supply to Improve

its Energy Security? (January 29, 2015). Forthcoming in a special issue of the International Journal of

Environmental Protection and Policy; Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.

190/2015. Available at SSRN:

http://ssrn.com/abstract=

2557387.

4. European Commission, SWD/2014/330, Commission Staff Working Document: In depth study of

European Energy Security Strategy.

https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-secu-

rity-strategy.

5. European Commission, COM/2014/330, Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council on European Energy Security Strategy.

6. European Commission, COM/2014/654, Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council on the short term resilience of the European gas system Preparedness for a

possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015.