Key priorities for the EU and the case of Greece
A. DAGOUMAS
99
of a single body charged with purchasing gas supplies
2
. In addition, a recent report
examined how the EU could diversify its energy supply to improve its energy securi-
ty
3
. Furthermore, the European Commission conducted an in-depth study on European
Energy Security
4
that accompanied its Communication on European Energy Security
Strategy
5
.
In response to the aforementioned concerns, the European Commission released its
Energy Security Strategy, in May 2014. The Strategy aimed to ensure a stable and abun-
dant supply of energy for European citizens and the economy. According to EU find-
ings, the Union imports more than half of all the energy it consumes. One key fact
that stands out in the studies undertaken by the EU is that the Union imports 53% of
the energy it consumes. Specifically, its import dependency for crude oil is particularly
high - almost 90%, and for natural gas 66%. To a lesser extent, EU imports of solid
fuels stand at 42% and nuclear fuel at 40%. Energy security of supply concerns every
Member State, although some are more vulnerable than others, such as Baltic States
and the South Eastern European countries that are less integrated into the current EU
energy system. The most pressing energy security of supply issue, however, remains the
strong dependence on a single external supplier. Supply disruptions need not only be a
product of political disputes, but they can also be caused by commercial differences or
possible infrastructure failure, as well. The EU’s energy dependency proved particularly
problematic during the 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis because some member states relied
either exclusively or predominantly on Russian gas leaving them to face acute short-
ages in gas supplies in the middle of the winter.
Figure 1 represents the natural gas dependency of each EU member state from Russia.
To assess the effects of a possible gas disruption on the EU, the Commission published
a Communication on the short-term resilience of the European gas system and the
level of preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the
fall and winter of 2014/2015
6
. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a 6-month gas disrup-
tion from Russia in each of the EU member states. These figures clearly highlight the
2. Patrick Donahue, ‘Poland’s Tusk Proposes Energy Union to Break Russian Hold on Gas’,
Bloomberg
Business,
April 22, 2014, viewed on July 3, 2015, <
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-cles/2014-04-22/poland-s-tusk-proposes-energy-union-to-break-russian-hold-on-gas >.
3. Leal-Arcas, Rafael and Alemany Rios, Juan, How Can the EU Diversify its Energy Supply to Improve
its Energy Security? (January 29, 2015). Forthcoming in a special issue of the International Journal of
Environmental Protection and Policy; Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.
190/2015. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2557387.
4. European Commission, SWD/2014/330, Commission Staff Working Document: In depth study of
European Energy Security Strategy.
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-secu-rity-strategy.
5. European Commission, COM/2014/330, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on European Energy Security Strategy.
6. European Commission, COM/2014/654, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on the short term resilience of the European gas system Preparedness for a
possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015.