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100
ÁÕ ÒÔÍ ÄÉÅÓÍÏÍ ÄÉËÁÉÎÄÎÒÉËÏÍ ÎÐÇÍÔÍ
11
. §ÁÒÑ×Í»ÅÉÁ, Ä×ÑÖÅÐÁ½ÍÅÒÁÉ È ÁËÐɼÕ
ÎÐÉÎÓ»ÒÈÑÈ ÒÈÕ »ÍÍÎÉÁÕ ÒÈÕ ÄÉËÎÍνÁÕ ËÁÉ ÒÈÕ ÄÉÁÄÉËÁѽÁÕ ÑÒÎ ÄÉÅÓÍ»Õ ÄÉËÁÉÎÄÎÒÉ˾
ÅĽÎ
12
. ¹ÔÕ ÅÉÑÈÁ½ÍÅÉ Î R. Kolb:
“In the context of judicial proceedings, the term ‘procedure’
lato sensu
covers all rules
relating to international judicial action. These include the rules governing the composition of
the court, questions of competence and admissibility, the objective and subjective conditions
for bringing a claim, as well as the modalities according to which the case will be dealt with.
In its narrowest sense, the term ‘judicial procedure’ relates only to that last element. It
comprises all rules and principles regulating the manner in which the proceedings (le pro-
cès) are conducted. Procedure in this narrow sense concerns the way by which the parties’
requests are dealt with by the court, from the institution of proceedings until the moment
of the final decision (and including subsequent requests for the interpretation or revision of
judgments, etc.). It will be noted that the term ‘rules of procedure’ can thus have a multipli-
city of meanings”
13
.
ÍÒÔÕ, ¾ÔÕ ÓÁ ÄÉÁÉÑÒÔÓŽ Á»ÑÔÕ ÁÐÁËÒÔ, Á¾ ÒÁ ËÁÒÁÑÒÁÒÉË, ÒÈ ÄÉ-
ËÁÑÒÈÐÉÁ˼ ÐÁËÒÉ˼ ËÁÉ ÍÎÎÌÎǽÁ »ÖÅÉ ÄÉÁÎÐÆÔÓŽ ËÁÉ ÁÍÁÒ×ÖÓŽ »ÍÁ
corpus
ÁÐÖÏÍ ËÁÉ ÅÇÇ×¼ÑÅÔÍ Î× Ò×ÇÖÍÎ×Í Å×ÐŽÁÕ ÅÆÁÐÎǼÕ, Ñ×ÍÁ˾ÌÎ×ÓÁ ÄÅ ËÁÉ ÉÁ
-ÑÖÅÒÉ˼- ÅÍÁоÍÉÑÈ ÒÔÍ ÁÐÖÏÍ ÄÉËÎÍνÁÕ ÄÉÁƾÐÔÍ ÄÉËÁÉÎÄÎÒÉËÏÍ ÎÐÇÍÔÍ
14
.
ÒÁÄÉÁË ÅÖÅÉ Á×ÒÎÍÎÈÓŽ ÒÎ (ÄȾÑÉÎ) ÄÉÅÓÍ»Õ ÄÉËÁÉÎÄÎÒÉ˾ ĽËÁÉÎ, ÔÕ ËÌÄÎÕ Î×
ÄÉ»ÅÉ ÒÈ ÌÅÉÒÎ×ÐǽÁ ÄÉÅÓÍÏÍ ÄÉËÁÉÎÄÎÒÉËÏÍ ÎÐÇÍÔÍ, ÅÄÐØÅÒÁÉ ÑÒÎ ÄÉÅÓÍ»Õ Ä½ËÁÉÎ,
»ÖÎÍÒÁÕ ÅÈÐÅÁÑÓŽ Æ×ÑÉË ËÁÉ Á¾ ÇÅÍÉË»Õ ÁÐÖ»Õ Î× ÁÍÒÌÎÀÍÒÁÉ Á¾ ÅÓÍÉË ÍÎÉ-
Ë Ñ×ÑÒ¼ÁÒÁ, ËÁÉ ÅÉÄÐ ËÁÉ ÔÕ Ñ×ÍÅËÒÉË¾Õ ÉÑÒ¾Õ ÒÈÕ ÄÉÅÓÍÎÀÕ ÄÉËÁÉÎÑÀÍÈÕ
15
. Á
11. ¯ S. Rosenne, ÑÒÉÕ ÅÉÑÁÇÔÇÉË»Õ ÁÐÁÒÈмÑÅÉÕ ÑÒÎ ËÅÆÌÁÉÎ ÁÆÉÅÐÔ»ÍÎ ÑÒÈ ÄÉÁÄÉËÁ-
ѽÁ ÅÍÏÉÎÍ ÒÎ× ÉÅÓÍÎÀÕ ÉËÁÑÒÈнÎ×, ÅÉÑÈÁ½ÍÅÉ ¾ÒÉ: “international law does not rec-
ognize a sharp distinction between substantive and adjective law”,
The Law and Practice
of the International Court of Justice 1920-2005
, 4
th
edition, Vol. III: Procedure, Leiden/
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, ÑÅÌ. 1021. ÉÁ ÉÁ Ñ×ؼÒÈÑÈ, ÂÌ. A. Nollkaemper,
“International Adjudication of Global Public Goods: The Intersection of Substance and
Procedure”, 23
EJIL
, 2012/3, ÑÅÌ. 769-791.
12. S. Rosenne,
The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice 1920-2005
, ¾. ÁÐ.,
ÑÅÌ. 1021, 1023. ÍÒÔÕ, Î Ñ×ÇÇÐÁÆ»ÁÕ ÁÆÉÅÐÏÍÅÉ ÅÍÁ ҾΠÒÎ× ÎÌÀÒÎÎ× »ÐÇÎ× ÒÎ× ÑÒÈ
ÄÉËÎÍνÁ ÒÎ× ÉÅÓÍÎÀÕ ÉËÁÑÒÈнÎ× ÒÔÍ ¥£.
13. R. Kolb, “General Principles of Procedural Law”,
The Statute of the International Court of
Justice. A Commentary
, Oxford University Press, 2006, ÑÅÌ. 793-835, ÉĽÔÕ ÑÅÌ. 795-796.
14. B. Cheng,
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
,
Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1953, R. Kolb, “General Principles of
Procedural Law”, ¾. ÁÐ., Sir E. Lauterpacht, “Principles of Procedure in International
Litigation”, 345
RCADI
, 2009, ÑÅÌ. 387-530.
15. ¯ Ch. De Visscher, ¼ÄÈ Á¾ ÒÎ 1966, ÁÍÁÄŽËÍ×Å ÒÈÍ Á×ÒÎÍνÁ ÒÎ× ÄÉËÎÍÎÉËÎÀ ÄÉËÁ½Î× ÒÎ×
ÉÅÓÍÎÀÕ ÉËÁÑÒÈнÎ× ÒÔÍ ¥ÍÔ»ÍÔÍ £ÓÍÏÍ: “[l]e droit procédural de la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice est une droit judiciare qui lui est propre et qui, très délibérément, se veut
tel. Les emprunts qui, aux origines de son élaboration, peuvent être faits à des législations
ou à des pratiques nationales se sont fondues en un corps de droit homogène”,
Aspects ré-
cents du droit procédural de la Cour internationale de Justice
, Paris, Pedone, 1966, p. 7. ÒÈÍ
½ÄÉÁ ÌÎÇÉ˼, L. Delbez,
Principes généraux du contentieux international
, ¾. ÁÐ., ÑÅÌ. 107Å.,