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151
ÒÉ˾ ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍ.
395
ÉÁ ÒÈÍ ËнÑÈ Åн Ñ×ÍÄÐÎ¼Õ ÒÎ× ËÐÉÒÈнÎ× ÒÎ× Ó»ÁÒÎÕ
ÄÈÎѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ, ÒÁ ËÁÒÏÒÅÐÁ ÄÉËÁÑÒ¼ÐÉÁ Ñ×ͼÓÔÕ ÌÁÂÍÎ×Í ×¾-
ÃÈ Á) ÒÎ »ÑÎ Å ÒÎ ÎνΠÄÉÁĽÄÅÒÁÉ Î Å½ÄÉËÎÕ ÖÁÐÁËÒÈÐÉѾÕ
396
, Â) ÒÈÍ ÉÄɾÒÈ-
ÒÁ ÒÎ× ÓÉÇλÍÎ×, ËÁÓÏÕ ¾ÒÁÍ Î ÅÍÇÔÍ Å½ÍÁÉ ÄȾÑÉΠоÑÔÎ Î ÉÑÖ×ÐÉѾÕ
ËнÍÅÒÁÉ ÅÊ ÎÐÉÑÎÀ ÔÕ ÄÈÎѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ
397
, Ç) ÅÍ Î ÉÑÖ×ÐÉÑ¾Õ ÁÆÎÐ
Ë×ÂÅÐÍÈÒÉ˼ ÄÐÁÑÒÈÐɾÒÈÒÁ
398
¼ ÅÍ Ç»ÍÅÉ ÎÌÉÒÉ˼ ÄÉÁÄÉËÁѽÁ, ËÁÉ Ò»ÌÎÕ Ä) ÒÎ
˽ÍÈÒÐÎ ÒÎ× ÎÉÌÈÒ¼.
3) ²¾ÓÅÑÈ Phelps
ToÍ ÄÉËÁÍÉ˾ Ñ×ÌÌÎÇÉѾ Î× ×ÉÎÓ»ÒÈÑÅ ÑÒÉÕ Dun & Bradstreet ËÁÉ Hepps
ÇÉÁ ÒÈÍ ËнÑÈ Åн ÁÐÎÖ¼Õ Ñ×ÍÒÁÇÁÒÉË¼Õ ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁÕ ÑÒÎ×Õ Ä×ÑÆÈÉÑÒÉËÎÀÕ
ÉÑÖ×ÐÉÑÎÀÕ, ÄÅÍ ÁËÎÌÎÀÓÈÑÅ ÒÎ ¡ ÑÒÈÍ Ð¾ÑÆÁÒÈ Á¾ÆÁѼ ÒÎ× ÑÒÈÍ ×¾-
ÓÅÑÈ Snyder v. Phelps.
399
±Î ÉËÁÑÒ¼ÐÉÎ ÅÇËÁÒ»ÌÅÉÃÅ ÒÈ Ñ×ͼÓÈ ÄÉÅÐÅÀÍÈÑÈ ÒÈÕ
ÉÄɾÒÈÒÁÕ ÒÎ× ÅÍÇÎÍÒÎÕ ÔÕ ÄÈÎѽÎ× ÐÎÑÏÎ× ¼ ÉÄÉÏÒÈ, ÑÅ Ñ×ÍÄ×ÁѾ Å ÒÈ
395. ÉÁ ÒÈ ÄÉÁÆÎÐÅÒÁÊÀ ÓÅÒÔÍ Î× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎ×Í ÒÎ ËÎÉ; ËÁÉ ÒÔÍ ÓÅÒÔÍ ÄÉËÁÉÎÌÎ-
ÇÈ»ÍÎ× ÄÈÎѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ ÂÌ. ÁÍÁÌ×ÒÉËÑÅ Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d
1057, 1065-1066 (1996), ¾Î× ÁÍÁÆ»ÐÅÒÁÉ Å½ Ì»ÊÅÉ: «The Dun & Bradstreet
contrast
of speech about “political and social changes,” “public affairs,” “self-government,”
and “public issues” with speech of “purely private concern” shows that the focus of
the phrase “matters of public concern” is not on speech that might be of popular
interest because it captures the attention of the public based on its sensational or
human interest aspects, but is instead on speech of constitutional interest because
it relates to the ordering of government and society at large. This approach is consis-
tent with Gertz,...,where the Court expressly rejected any test that turns on a judicial
determination of whether the content of the defamatory statement attracted public
interest....In rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality approach, the Gertz Court reasoned
that, on the one hand, a private individual would have no recourse if the publication
concerned a matter that happened to be popular or of general interest; thus, the
Rosenbloom plurality test was under-protective of the private figure. On the other
hand, the uncertainty of determining what is of popular interest would insufficiently
protect the publisher, who would be left to the mercy of the common law if it mis-
judged the issue...Thus, Gertz, like Dun & Bradstreet, rejects any distinction in consti-
tutional protection based on what may happen to capture public attention and what
does not».
396. ¢Ì. ÅÍÄÅÉËÒÉËRoe v. City of San Fransisco, 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997), Rabren v.
Straigis, 498 So.2d 1362, 1363 (D.C. 1986), ¢rown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d
711, 752 (Cal.S.Ct. 1989), Mandel v. The Boston Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198 (U.S. App.
2006)
397. ¢Ì. ÅÍÄÅÉËÒÉËDworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 1989).
¢Ì. ËÁÉ ÒÈÍ Á¾ÆÁÑÈ ÒÎ× ¡ ÑÒÈÍ ×¾ÓÅÑÈ Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
52 (1988), «speech relating to public figures...does have constitutional value».
398. ¢Ì. ÅÍÄÅÉËÒÉËAyala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 1057, 1066 (D.C. 1996), Nizam-Aldine v.
City of Oakland, 47 Cal.App.4th 364, 376 (1996)
399. 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011)