Η ΑΙΧΜΗΡΗ ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΩΣ ΣΥΝΤΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ - page 40

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Ó»ÒÅÉ ÅˍÎÄÏÍ ÒÎ×Õ ËÁ;ÍÅÕ ÒÎ× common law, ÔÑÒ¾ÑÎ, ÎÉ Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉËν ÅÐÉ-
ÎÐÉьν ŽÍÁÉ, ÒÎ×ÌÖÉÑÒÎÍ ÑŠˍÎÉÎ ÂÁӌ¾, ÌÉǾÒÅÐÎ Á×ÑÒÈÐν ÑÅ ÑÖ»ÑÈ ŒÅ
Á×ÒÎÀÕ Î× Ò½ÓÅÍÒÁÉ ¾ÒÁÍ Î ÅÍÇÔÍ Å½ÍÁÉ ÄȌ¾ÑÉÎ Ð¾ÑԍΠËÁÉ Î Ì¾ÇÎÕ ÄȌÎ-
ѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ. ¹ÒÁÍ Î Ì¾ÇÎÕ Å½ÍÁÉ ËÁÓÁÐ ÉÄÉÔÒÉËÎÀ ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ ËÁÉ
Î ÅÍÇÔÍ ÉÄÉÏÒÈÕ, ¾ÔÕ ÑÒÈÍ Dun & Bradstreet, ÎÉ Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉËν ËÁ;ÍÅÕ ÄÅÍ
ōÉÂÌÌÎ×Í ÁÁÐÁ½ÒÈÒÁ ˍÎÉÁ ÁÌÌÁǼ ÒÎ×ÌÖÉÑÒÎÍ ÑŠˍÎÉÎ×Õ Á¾ ÒÎ×Õ ËÁ-
;ÍÅÕ ÒÎ× common law».384
¡¾ ÒÁ ÁÐÁÍÔ ÐÎËÀÒÅÉ ¾ÒÉ È Hepps ËÁÉ È Dun & Bradstreet »ÄÔÑÁÍ
ÒÈ Ä×ÍÁÒ¾ÒÈÒÁ ÑÒÉÕ ÎÌÉÒŽÅÕ ÍÁ ÅÆÁЌ¾ØÎ×Í ÒÎ common law ÑÅ ÎÐÉь»ÍÅÕ
ÅÐɍÒÏÑÅÉÕ. ¬ÑÒ¾ÑÎ, ÄÅÍ ÅÊÅÉĽËÅ×ÑÁÍ ¾ÒÅ ÎÉ ÎÌÉÒŽÅÕ Ð»ÅÉ ÍÁ ÁлÖÎ×Í
Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉ˼ ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁ ÑÒÎ×Õ Ä×ÑÆȌÉÑÒÉËÎÀÕ ÉÑÖ×ÐÉьÎÀÕ ËÁÉ ¾ÒÅ ŒÎ-
ÐÎÀÍ ÍÁ ÅÆÁЌ¾ØÎ×Í ÒÎ×Õ ÄÉËÎÀÕ ÒÎ×Õ ËÁ;ÍÅÕ. ŸÒÈ Hepps, ÒÎ šÉËÁÑÒ¼ÐÉÎ ÄÅÍ
ō»Ì×ÑÅ ÐÈÒÏÕ ÒΠؼÒȌÁ ÒÈÕ ËÁÒÁÍΌ¼Õ ÒÎ× ÂÐÎ×Õ Á¾ÄÅÉÊÈÕ ÒÎ× ÃÅÀÄÎ×Õ
ÒÔÍ ÉÑÖ×ÐÉьÏÍ ¾ÒÁÍ Î ÉÑÖ×ÐÉь¾Õ ÄÅÍ ÁÆÎРؼÒȌÁ ÄȌÎѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎ-
ÍÒÎÕ.385 AÍÒ½ÑÒÎÉÖÁ, ÑÒÈÍ ÁÐÁÍÔ ÅнÒÔÑÈ, ¾ÑÎÍ ÁÆÎÐ ÑÒÈÍ ×ÁÉÒɾÒÈ-
ÒÁ, È Dun & Bradstreet ÄÅÍ ÁÅÆÍÓÈ ÐÈÒÏÕ ¾ÒÉ ÅÆÁЌ¾ØÅÒÁÉ È ÁÍÒÉËÅɌÅÍÉ˼
Å×ÓÀÍÈ ÒÎ× common law. žÅÐÁÉÒ»ÐÔ, ÁÂÅÂÁɾÒÈÒÁ ׍ÐÖÅÉ ÔÕ ÐÎÕ ÒΠؼÒÈ-
ŒÁ ÅÍ È ÅÆÁЌÎǼ ÒÔÍ ËÁ;ÍÔÍ ÒÎ× common law ÅÐÉÎнØÅÒÁÉ ÑÒÎ ÌÁ½ÑÉÎ
384. ±Î ÖÁÐÁËÒÈÐÉÑÒÉ˾ Á¾ÑÁьÁ ÒÈÕ Hepps »ÖÅÉ Å½ Ì»ÊÅÉ ÔÕ ÅʼÕ: «One can discern in
these decisions two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to
the First Amendment. The first is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is
instead a private figure. The second is whether the speech at issue is of public concern.
When the speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure,
the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier before
recovering damages from a media defendant than is raised by the common law. When
the speech is of public concernbut the plaintiff is a private figure, as inGertz, theConsti-
tution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the constitutional require-
ments are, in at least some of their range, less forbidding than when the plaintiff is a
public figure and the speech is of public concern. When the speech is exclusively private
concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional
requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the
common-law landscape», 475 U.S. 767, 775. ™ÉÁ ÒÁ ËÐÉÒ¼ÐÉÁ Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉË¼Õ ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁÕ
ËÁÉ ÒÈÍ ËÁÒÁÍΌ¼ ÒÎ× ÂÐÎ×Õ Á¾ÄÅÉÊÈÕ ÂÌ. ÖÁÐÁËÒÈÐÉÑÒÉËËÁÉ ÑÅ Ayala v.Washington,
679A.2d 1057, 1062-1063 (D.C. 1996), Mandel v. The Boston Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198
(U.S. App. 2006), Staheli v. Smith, 548 So.2d 1299 (¨iss.S.Ct.1989), Della-Donna v. Gore
Newspapers Co., 489 So.2d72 (1986).
385. BÌ. ÁÍÁÌ×ÒÉË ÑÅ Smolla R.A., Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A ®ew
¡nalytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 Geo.L.J. 1519, 1526 (1987).
¢Ì. ËÁÉ Taylor D.M., ¾.., 175-176 ËÁÉ 183, ¾Î× ÁÍÁÆ»ÐÅÉ ¾ÒÉ ÒÎ ¡š, ÁÍÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÁÕ ¾ÒÉ
ÑÒÈÍ ÔÕ ÍÔ ÅнÒÔÑÈ (private figure/private speech category) ÄÅÍ ÁÁÉÒŽÒÁÉ ÁÌ-
ÌÁǼ ÑÒÎ×Õ ËÁ;ÍÅÕ ÒÎ× common law, ÆÈÑÅ ÁÍÎÉÖÒ¾ ÒÎ ÅÍÄÅÖ¾ŒÅÍÎ ÒÈÕ Å½ÐÐÉÃÈÕ
ÒÎ× ÂÐÎ×Õ Á¾ÄÅÉÊÈÕ ÒÈÕ Á̼ÓÅÉÁÕ ÒÔÍ ÉÑÖ×ÐÉьÏÍ ÑÒÎÍ ÅÍÁǾŒÅÍÎ, ¾ÒÁÍ Î Ì¾ÇÎÕ
ŽÍÁÉ ÉÄÉÔÒÉËÎÀ ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ ¼ ¾ÒÁÍ ÐλÐÖÅÒÁÉ Á¾ ÅÍÁǾŒÅÍÎ – ŒÈ ÅˍоÑԍΠÒÔÍ
¨¨£ (non-media defendant).