Η ΑΙΧΜΗΡΗ ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΩΣ ΣΥΝΤΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ - page 30

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¾ÐÉÑÅ ÒÈÍ ÁÍÔÒ»ÐÔ Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉ˼ ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁ Œ¾ÍÎ ÑÒÉÕ ÅÐɍÒÏÑÅÉÕ Î× Î Å½-
ÄÉËÎÕ ÉÑÖ×ÐÉь¾Õ ÁÆÎÐÎÀÑŠؼÒȌÁ ÄȌÎѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ.342 H Gertz, Îн-
ØÎÍÒÁÕ ¾ÒÉ ÅÍÁ¾ËÅÉÒÁÉ ÑÒÉÕ ÎÌÉÒŽÅÕ ÍÁ ËÁÓÎнÑÎ×Í ÒÎ ÂÁӌ¾ ÌȌŒ»ÌÅÉÁÕ Î×
ÁÁÉÒŽÒÁÉ ÑÒÉÕ ÅÐɍÒÏÑÅÉÕ Î× Î ÓÉǾŒÅÍÎÕ Å½ÍÁÉ ÉÄÉÏÒÈÕ, ĽÖÔÕ ÍÁ ÄÉÁËнÍÅÉ
ŒÅÒÁÊÀ Ó»ŒÁÒÎÕ ÄȌÎѽÎ× ËÁÉ ŒÈ ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ, ׍ÎÍÎÎÀÑÅ ¾ÒÉ ËÓÅ Ä×ÑÆÈ-
ŒÉÑÒÉË¾Õ ÉÑÖ×ÐÉь¾Õ ÐÎÑÒÁÒÅÀÅÒÁÉ Á¾ ÒÈÍ žÐÏÒÈ ±Ð΍΍νÈÑÈ. 343 ¥ Œ¾ÍÈ ÄÉ-
ËÐÉÑÈ ÑÒÈÍ ÎÎ½Á ÐλÂÈ ÓŌÅÌÉÔ;ÒÁÍ ÑÒÈÍ ÉÄɾÒÈÒÁ ÒÎ× ÓÉÇΌ»ÍÎ× ËÁÉ ÒÁ
ËÁÒÏÒÅÐÁ ÄÉËÁÑÒ¼ÐÉÁ ÂÁѽØÎÍÒÁÍ ÑÒÈÍ Gertz ÐÎËÅɌ»ÍÎ× ÍÁ ÅÆÁЌ¾ÑÎ×Í ÒÎ×Õ
ÅÐÉÎÐÉьÎÀÕ ÒÈÕ žÐÏÒÈÕ ±Ð΍΍νÈÑÈÕ ÑÅ ¾ÌÅÕ ÒÉÕ ×ÎÓ»ÑÅÉÕ Î× Î ÓÉǾŒÅÍÎÕ
¼ÒÁÍ ÉÄÉÏÒÈÕ, ÁÍÅÊÁÐÒ¼ÒÔÕ ÒÈÕ ÆÀÑÈÕ ÒÎ× ÐÎÑÂÁÌ̾ŒÅÍÎ× Ì¾ÇÎ×. Ÿ×ÍōÏÕ,
È Dun & Bradstreet ŒÅ½ÔÑÅ ÒÈÍ ÁÐÅÖ¾ŒÅÍÈ ÑÒÎ×Õ ÅÍÁÇΌ»ÍÎ×Õ Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉ˼
ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁ ÑŠ׍ÎÓ»ÑÅÉÕ Ä×ÑƼŒÈÑÈÕ ÉÄÉÔÒÏÍ ÑÅ ÑÖ»ÑÈ ŒÅ Á×Ò¼ Î× ÁÎ̌-
ÂÁÍÁÍ ÂÑÅÉ ÒÈÕ Rosenbloom ¼ ÒÈÕ Gertz.344 žÅÐÁÉÒ»ÐÔ, ÁоÌÎ Î× ÒÎ ¡š
ÁÅÆÍÓÈ Œ¾ÍÎ ¾ÑÎÍ ÁÆÎÐ ÑÒÈÍ ÅÆÁЌÎǼ ÒÔÍ ËÁ;ÍÔÍ ÒÈÕ Gertz ÑÖÅÒÉË
ŒÅ ÒÈÍ ÅÉĽËÁÑÈ ×ÎÓÅÒÉËÏÍ ØȌÉÏÍ ËÁÉ ÒÈÍ ÅÉÂÎ̼ ÎÉÍÏÍ Ñ×ÍÅÒÉьÎÀ, ŒÅ
ÒÈÍ ÅÉÑÁÇÔǼ ÒÎ× ËÐÉÒÈнÎ× ÒÎ× Ó»ŒÁÒÎÕ ÄȌÎѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ ËÁÉ ÒÈÍ ÔÕ
ÍÔ ÅЌÈÍŽÁ ÒÈÕ Gertz, ÐÎËÌÅÑÅ ÇÅÍÉ˾ÒÅÐÈ ÑÀÇÖ×ÑÈ ÑÒÁ ËÁÒÏÒÅÐÁ ÄÉËÁ-
ÑÒ¼ÐÉÁ, ÁƼÍÎÍÒÁÕ ÁÍÁÍÒÈÒÎ ÒÎ ÅÐÏÒȌÁ ÅÍ ÑÒÉÕ ×ÎÓ»ÑÅÉÕ Î× Î ÓÉǾŒÅ-
ÍÎÕ Å½ÍÁÉ ÉÄÉÏÒÈÕ ËÁÉ ÒÎ ËÐÉÓ»Í Ø¼ÒȌÁ ÉÄÉÔÒÉËÎÀ ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ ÁлÖÅÒÁÉ ÅÍ
Ç»ÍÅÉ Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉ˼ ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁ ÑÒÎ×Õ Ä×ÑÆȌÉÑÒÉËÎÀÕ ÉÑÖ×ÐÉьÎÀÕ.345 ¨ÎÐŽ
342. ¥ ÔÕ ÍÔ ÁÍÒ½ÆÁÑÈ ÅÉÑȌÍÓÈËÅ ËÁÉ Á¾ ÒÎÍ šÉËÁÑÒ¼ White, Π΍νÎÕ Ñ׌ÆÏÍÈÑÅ
ŒÅ ÒÎ ÄÉÁÒÁËÒÉ˾ ÒÈÕ Á¾ÆÁÑÈÕ ÑÒÈÍ ×¾ÓÅÑÈ Dun & Bradstreet ÂÑÅÉ ¾ŒÔÕ ÄÉÁÆÎÐÅ-
ÒÉËÎÀ ÑËōÒÉËÎÀ («I had thought that the decision in Gertz was intended to reach cases
that involve any false statements of fact injurious to reputation...whether or not [the
statement] implicates a matter of public importance», 472 U.S. 749, 772), ËÁÓÏÕ ËÁÉ
ÑÒÈ ÄÉÁÆÔÍÎÀÑÁ ÎÃÈ ÒÎ× šÉËÁÑÒ¼ Brennan («One searches Gertz in vain for a single
words to support the proposition that limits on presumed and punitive damages ob-
tained onlywhen speech involvedmatters of public concern. Gertz could not have been
grounded in such a premise. Distrust of placing in the courts the power to decide what
speech was of public concern was precisely the rationale Gertz offered for rejecting the
Rosenbloomplurality approach», 472U.S. 749, 786n. 11).
343. BÌ. ÑÖÅÒÉËEstlund C.L., ¾.., 11, ¨attingly S J., 763, Joy De Vonna, The “public interest
or concern” test – Have we resurrected a standard that should have remained in the
defamation graveyard?, 70Marq.L.Rev. 647, 654 (1987)
344. ¢Ì. ÑÖÅÒÉËEstlund C.L., ¾.., 12, ׍ÎÑ. 65, Lewis D., ¾.., 774-775, ±aylor D.M., ¾..,
174, Smolla R.A., ¾.., 1541, Stern N., ¾.., 642, ¾Î× ÅÉÑȌÁ½ÍÅÒÁÉ ¾ÒÉ, ÑÅ ÁÍÒ½ÓÅÑÈ ŒÅ
ÒÈÍ Rosenbloom, ¾Î× ÒÎ ËÐÉÒ¼ÐÉÎ ÒÎ× Ó»ŒÁÒÎÕ ÄȌÎѽÎ× ÅÍÄÉÁÆ»ÐÎÍÒÎÕ ÖÐÈÑɌ΍ÎÉ-
¼ÓÈËÅ ÐÎËÅɌ»ÍÎ× ÍÁ ōÅËÒÁÓŽ È Ñ×ÍÒÁnjÁÒÉ˼ ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁ ÂÑÅÉ ÒÈÕ ÅÆÁЌÎÇ¼Õ ÒÎ×
ËÁ;ÍÁ ÒÎ× ÐÁnjÁÒÉËÎÀ ľÌÎ×, ÑÒÈ Dun & Bradstreet, ÒÎ ¡š ÖÐÈÑɌ΍νÈÑÅ ÒÎ ÅÍ
̾ÇÔ ËÐÉÒ¼ÐÉÎ ÐÎËÅɌ»ÍÎ× ÍÁ ÅÐÉÎнÑÅÉ ÒÎ ÅĽΠÅÆÁЌÎÇ¼Õ ÒÈÕ ÁÐÅÖ¾ŒÅÍÈÕ Á¾
ÒÈÍ žÐÏÒÈ ±Ð΍΍νÈÑÈ ÐÎÑÒÁѽÁÕ.
345. ¢Ì. ÒÉÕ Á¾ÃÅÉÕ Î× ÄÉÁÒ׍ÏÓÈËÁÍ ÑÒÈ ÓÅÔнÁ ËÁÉ ÒÈÍ ÅÆÁЌÎǼ ÒÈÕ Dun & Brad-
street Á¾ ÒÁ ËÁÒÏÒÅÐÁ ÄÉËÁÑÒ¼ÐÉÁ ÑÅ Walden R. – Silver D., Deciphering Dun &